Dear Neighbors:
This is an exciting time of year for Red Sox fans. After many seasons in the wilderness, this year’s team has achieved the improbable result of making the playoffs, providing a boost to many seeking modest relief in difficult times. In this week’s letter, I will discuss WPRI-12’s disclosure of the draft Forensic Audit Report commissioned by the Governor to determine the causes of the failure of the (former) westbound span of the Washington Bridge.
A. The WPRI Report
On Friday evening, WPRI published a Report announcing its receipt of a draft “Forensic Audit Report” (dated April 5, 2024) the State commissioned to review and analyze the causes of the failure of the (former) westbound span of the Washington Bridge. You can read the draft Report by clicking here. According to WPRI, the Attorney General published the draft Report on his lawsuit web page for the first time after WPRI contacted him about their story. In a Providence Journal article, the Governor remarked that the State had provided the Report to opposing counsel in the lawsuit the State brought seeking damages from the contractors the State hired to perform work on the bridge. Item No. 103 on the Attorney General’s lawsuit web page indicates that, on April 1 of this year, the State produced 22,353 pages of documents to opposing counsel, presumably including the Draft Report.
B. The Draft Audit Report’s Findings
1. Shared Responsibility
The parties to the lawsuit are probably most interested in its finding that the causes of the failure were foreseeable (p. 52), and that the State shared responsibility with the contractors as stated at page 42:
The statewide program manager is assigned the duties and responsibilities for bridge inspection, reporting and inventory. These duties and responsibilities may then be delegated by the statewide program manager to project managers (Consultants) and team leaders within the State. Although the statewide program manager may choose to delegate some or all functions to other bridge inspection personnel, the statewide program manager retains all responsibility for bridge inspection operations for which he or she was assigned.
2. Recommendations Going Forward
I find at least equally important the Report’s recommendations for changes in the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) going forward, which it states at p. 53 as follows:
What actions or policy recommendations are recommended to prevent similar types of events from occurring in the future?
The entity responsible for safety inspections within RIDOT should conduct a review of structures that could be considered complex to identify critical elements or details, to include but not limited to NSTMs [non-redundant steel tension members]. For critical portions of a structure that do not have a specific element defined in the bridge management system, consider establishing specific agency defined elements (ADEs) to ensure that the elements are properly inspected/addressed with each applicable inspection. In addition, RIDOT should review its processes for prioritizing and following up on work recommendations provided in inspection reports.
C. The Need For Effective Legislative Oversight
As noted in my September 2, 2024 letter, the General Assembly conducted an oversight hearing concerning the bridge closure in February, 2024, asking the RIDOT Director to explain why the bridge failure occurred. The Director declined to answer, stating that his department was preparing a forensic audit report that would provide a full explanation. After the State sued the contractors, however, RIDOT refused to release the report because the matter was in litigation. At the time, I called this a version of “Catch-22.”
I remain mystified by the apparent fact that the people of the State of Rhode Island, who paid for the bridge, who suffer harm from its partial failure and who will pay for its replacement, could not learn about the contents of this Draft Report until there was a media investigation, over a year after the Draft Report was submitted to RIDOT, and almost six months after the Draft Report was forwarded to lawyers for the companies the State is suing. I wonder what other important lessons we can learn from the 22,353 pages the State produced to opposing counsel on April 1, but we are not allowed to see. We should not have to wait until the conclusion of the lawsuit (which may still be years away) to find out.
We are grateful to WPRI for its investigation. I will ask my legislative colleagues to hold additional oversight hearings on the Washington Bridge when we return to session. Perhaps then we can learn more about (1) how and why the bridge failed, and (2) what changes RIDOT has implemented since April 5, 2024 to prevent (or at least reduce the chance of) future failures taking place.