Ward 2 News

Dear Neighbors:

I hope you found a way to observe Earth Day this past Monday. We began celebrating this holiday in 1970, and its significance only grows with each passing year. In this week’s letter I discuss the Department of Health’s pandemic resiliency program and the Governor’s re-allocation of federal pandemic relief funds.

1.     The Department Of Health Budget

This past Tuesday, the Department of Health (DOH) presented the Governor’s proposed budget. In Slide 19 of its Presentation, the Department noted that it “expects that the COVID-19 variant will continue to evolve and may lead to occasional surges.” In the next slide, the Department listed the State’s vaccination rates for various respiratory diseases, including a 17% rate for the 2023-24 COVID vaccine. (In contrast, the flu vaccine rate for individuals 65 and over was 55%). I asked the DOH officials if they could do more to increase our vaccination rate and/or implement other programs to increase our pandemic resiliency. They acknowledged more could be done, but the DOH budget failed to utilize $20 million of available funds it had received through the American Recovery Plan Act (ARPA).

2.    Redirection Of ARPA Funds

We learned last week of the Governor’s plans to reallocate ARPA funds. In Budget Amendment 11, he proposes (1) reducing Department of Health’s ARPA budget by $20 million, (2) canceling a $35 million marina project in East Providence (which did not raise sufficient outside matching funds) and (3) redirecting $5 million previously designated for housing programs. In Budget Amendment 12, the Governor proposes repurposing this roughly $60 million on homelessness initiatives ($16 million), replenishing the unemployment insurance trust fund ($24 million) and construction of the replacement Washington Bridge ($20 million).

The Senate Finance Committee will review these proposals at its meeting next Tuesday, April 30. I will seek answers to these questions:

• The primary purpose of the ARPA funds was to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects. Before we remove $20 million from the DOH budget, are we sure we have done our best to build resilience against future respiratory pandemics?

• Before we allocate additional money to the unemployment insurance trust fund, shouldn’t we first close the $8 million hole in the RIPTA budget first noted in my January 21 letter?

• Is it premature to allocate $20 million to the Washington Bridge project when we haven’t yet defined its scope, received bids, know its cost, know what federal funding is available, and propose the allocation of federal funds that must be “obligated” by the end of this year?

My January 21 letter noted that the initial allocation of $10 million in ARPA funds to RIPTA to partially fill an $18 million gap in next year’s budget was problematic because it used one-time federal money to address a structural deficit in future years. With that said, even that allocation leaves a further $8 million gap which will create a crisis next year if it is not closed with additional state or federal funds. I need to hear an explanation why it would be better to redirect additional ARPA funds to the unemployment insurance trust fund rather than close the remaining $8 million hole in RIPTA’s 2024-25 budget.

Dear Neighbors:

If you were not able to see the total eclipse yourself, I hope you heard a good story (and saw a good picture) from someone who did. Returning to Earth, this week’s letter discusses the need for updates on the Washington Bridge, the sustainability of Medicaid programs after the expiration of federal pandemic relief funds and an upcoming community meeting.

1. Legislating Transparency For The Washington Bridge Project

On Wednesday, the Senate Oversight Committee heard a Bill that would require the Department of Transportation to provide a standard format “snapshot report” each month on its Washington Bridge website providing current data on such issues as (1) the construction timeline, (2) traffic levels, (3) frequency of accidents and breakdowns and (4) travel times. In a different world, it would not be necessary to invoke the legislative process to obtain the regular public disclosure of this type of basic information.

2. Post-COVID Changes In Medicaid Programs

a. Difficult Choice Following The Expiration Of Federal Funds

On Thursday, the Senate Finance Committee reviewed the budget of the Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS), the agency responsible for operating Rhode Island’s Medicad program. For the past three years, significant federal American Rescue Plan Act funds have paid for expanded Medicaid social and health services to respond to the medical and emotional impacts of the pandemic. The Governor’s budget includes funding to raise the reimbursement rates for Medicaid providers, phasing in an additional $210 million commitment over three years to address some of these gaps, but many remain. The General Assembly will face difficult choices in deciding which remaining gaps to address with the loss of federal funds.

b. Possible Cost Savings

The Committee learned of one area to realize savings without reducing services. Last month, the Office of Auditor General released a Report describing redundant Medicaid capitation coverage during 2019-21. (Capitation coverage refers to payments per person that Medicaid makes for recipients enrolled in health maintenance organizations). The Report revealed that Rhode Island expended over $38 million in Medicaid funds (of which $16.5 million were State funds) during those three years on recipients who resided in a different state and received coverage from that state. EOHHS informed the Committee that it has tightened its controls to prevent these double payments going forward.

While the Committee was pleased to learn this, I believe the federal government is in the best position to prevent these double payments both in Rhode Island and nationally, as it presumably has (or has access to) information to identify every capitation recipient in every state. This information could allow federal Medicaid to screen for matches to end double coverage everywhere. EOHHS officials agreed this solution should exist in theory, but they do not know how to make it happen.

c. Community Meeting

This Monday (April 15) evening at 7:00-8:00 p.m. at the Dr. Martin Luther King Elementary School at 35 Camp Street, the Ward 3 Democratic Committee will host a public meeting of the City and State legislators who represent parts of the Ward. We will discuss our projects during the current session. They describe the meeting in this flyer. I look forward to learning from our neighbors about their priorities and how I can do a better job in the Senate. Please consider joining us.

Dear Neighbors:

While COVID inflicted great pain and suffering, our ability to adapt brought benefits we continue to enjoy today, including Zoom and expanded voting. I recently was Providence (Early) Voter No. 9 in this year’s Presidential primary, and I encourage you to exercise your right to vote in any of the ways now available (including voting in person on April 2). In this week’s letter, I will discuss the ongoing work of the Senate commission studying possible reforms in the Providence Public School Department (“PPSD”).

1. A Vision For Education In Providence

This past Monday (March 18), the Commission held its fourteenth meeting, at which it reviewed the Second Draft Report. This Report describes (at page 18) a vision of PPSD’s future that combines greater professional fulfillment for teachers with improved outcomes for students containing these elements:

• Providence Public Schools will provide a work environment that will attract and retain high quality educational professionals.
• All educators within Providence Public Schools have a shared commitment to provide all children with a quality public education.
• All educators have a meaningful voice and collaborative role in fulfilling their shared commitment.
• Teachers have a responsibility to maintain high professional standards, and they have the authority and responsibility to support their colleagues in meeting them.
• All educators are personally accountable for the quality of their contribution to this shared commitment.

2. The Example of the Springfield, Massachusetts Empowerment Zone Partnership

A cohort of Springfield, Massachusetts middle and high schools organized into an Empowerment Zone Partnership (“SEZP”) that realized a tangible version of this vision, anchored in a Collective Bargaining Agreement that was ratified by 96% of the union membership. Among the key reforms SEZP achieved (and which PPSD would benefit from emulating) are the following:

• Dispute Resolution Process: Expedited Mediation and Arbitration (Article 19);
• Establishing teacher leadership teams as the vehicle for shared decision-making at the school level (Articles 22-24);
• Authorizing principals to select the best qualified staff from both internal and external candidates without regard to seniority (Article 28);
• Authorizing the Empowerment Zone to reassign displaced teachers and staff to positions for which they are qualified (Article 30);
• Site-based management for professional development (Article 33);
• Reducing the role for seniority in teacher assignments (Article 29), teacher displacements (Article 30) and reductions in force (Article 36);
• Expedited dismissal and discipline (Article 37);
• Establishing a joint labor-management evaluation team (Article 44);
• Creating a career ladder (Article 63) including stipends/additional pay for leadership and other roles (Article 65) and for exceptional performance (Article 67);
• Shared expectations for collaboration between principals and teacher leadership teams (Appendix A)

SEZP published an Impact Summary noting its gains in many areas, including student achievement, faculty diversity and the development of students’ social and emotional skills.

3.     Presentations By Commission Experts

The experts who presented to the Commission describe SEZP’s type of labor-management relationship as “professional unionism.” The 96% approval vote by the Springfield Education’ Association’s membership demonstrates conclusively how these reforms are properly viewed as both pro-student and pro-union. These ideas are not new to Providence, as many of them appear in the 1993 Providence Blueprint for Education (“PROBE”) Report.

4.     The Second Draft Report’s Recommendations

Pages 26-36 of the Second Draft Report contain recommendations to support PPSD’s ability to realize this vision, including collaborative bargaining, building capacity, increasing administrative accountability and removing legislative barriers. In the coming weeks, the Commission will make further revisions to the Report based on Monday’s meeting with the goal of producing a final draft for a vote.

5.     My Perspective

I view my work on this Commission as my most important project in the Senate. As a Providence Public Schools student, parent and School Board member, as a Providence City Council member and now as a State Senator, I have seen how important our public schools are to the future of our children, our families, our City and our State. I believe in my heart that Providence Public Schools is capable of achieving the benefits of the professional unionism we see in the Springfield Empowerment Zone Partnership, and that our successful future depends critically upon the ability of Providence Public Schools labor and management to achieve them.

Dear Neighbors:

At Thursday’s Senate session, we wore purple to honor International Women’s Day (I also wore it to celebrate Classical High School’s basketball victory) following last week’s celebration of Black History Month. Combining these two occasions, I attended a class yesterday that studied a famous speech by Sojourner Truth, who was a leader in the causes of both abolition and women’s rights. In this week’s letter, I discuss the Commerce Corporation and a bill I introduced this session.

1.     The Commerce Corporation

The Senate Finance Committee reviewed the Commerce Corporation budget last week. Among other things, we reviewed the Corporation’s decision to approve the Tidewater Landing soccer stadium bond that requires $132 million in payments over time to provide $27 million in financing, or almost $5 in payments for each dollar of financing, making it the most expensive publicly funded minor league soccer stadium. This results in part from a high interest rate (7.24%), but even at that interest rate, the total financing costs of a 30-year home mortgage would be less than half of what Commerce is paying to finance Tidewater Landing. This decision has raised serious questions concerning its value proposition.

Looking for lessons to learn, I reviewed the minutes of Commerce Corporation meetings over the last two years. I learned that Commerce usually makes decisions with broad consensus – of the 101 substantive votes it took, 95 were unanimous and three more were unopposed with members recusing, leaving only three votes with opposition. Of those three, two received only token opposition, resulting in votes of 5-2 on one matter and 8-1 on another. The only closely divided vote involved Tidewater Landing, when on July 25, 2022, the Governor voted to break a tie to force approval with a 6-5 vote, with one member abstaining and another recusing; i.e. fewer than a majority of the full Commerce Corporation supported the measure.

At the hearing, I recommended to the Commerce Secretary that the Corporation should adopt a two-thirds rule for its votes, as this would not affect 99% of their votes, while causing them to pause before moving forward on the 1% of matters on which they are seriously divided. If Commerce does not set this guardrail on its own, it may be appropriate to advance legislation.

2.     Legislative Program

I introduced Bill S-2569 to revise the “state share” component of our education aid funding formula to match that of Massachusetts. Rhode Island calculates the state’s share of each community’s foundation budget by comparing each community’s property tax base per enrolled child (as measured against the statewide average). While this measure is a useful first approximation, the fact remains that some students have greater needs, and their education requires greater local and state resources.

Consider the example of two communities, A and B, each of which has a property tax base of $100 million and an enrollment of 100 students. Suppose, however, that A’s students are all native English speakers from affluent families, while half of B’s students are multi-language learners from households in poverty. As reflected in Rhode Island’s funding formula, Community B’s foundation budget will be at least 20% larger than Community A’s, as “student success factor” will be added to the cost to educate each student who is either in poverty and/or is a multi-language learner.

From this difference in the composition of student population, it follows that Community B will require a larger “tax effort” to pay its share of the cost to educate its resident student population than will Community A. Because Rhode Island’s current funding formula does not account for this difference, our formula would apply the same “state share” to both communities.

In contrast, Massachusetts calculates state share by comparing each community’s property tax base to its foundation budget, rather than its property tax base per student. Adjusting the state share in this way would be largely “expenditure neutral,” i.e., it would not require additional State dollars, but it would redirect significant State aid to communities with students in poverty and multilanguage learners, including Providence.

I have introduced 14 other bills you can view by clicking on this link.  In future letters, I will discuss some of these other bills from this list in greater detail.

I hope you had the chance to observe Black History Month, perhaps taking the Providence Walking Tour which I recommend. In this week’s letter, I will discuss how a draft report from RIDOT’s consultant changes my tentative understanding of the past, present and future of the Washington Bridge.

1.     The VN Report 

a.     The Role of the Tie-Down “Pins”

On February 21, RIDOT’s consultant VN submitted a Draft Report concerning the current condition of the northern span of the Washington Bridge and remediation options. As noted in a Providence Journal article, the draft report can be read to view the broken tie-down rods (or “pins”) as a symptom of more significant structural vulnerabilities which overwhelmed the capacity of the “pins” to hold the bridge together.

b.     Broader Structural Weaknesses

The Report details structural flaws, not only along Span 7, but also throughout the entire length of the bridge. In my untrained reading, the report focuses on a key component in the bridge’s understructure supporting the road deck above it. That understructure consists of a series of concrete “beams” that straddle the piers anchored in the Seekonk riverbed. The concrete beams depend critically upon steel cables (or “tendons”) that run through the beams, and which are held in tension with fixed anchors at either end, resulting in what is called a “cantilever beam post-tensioning system.”

To my understanding, the VN Report finds significant deterioration of the steel components that hold the concrete beams in tension in Span 7, degrading of the “grout” that surrounds and protects the tendons within the beams, and degrading of the concrete in the beams themselves. While focused on Span 7, the VN Report finds signs of similar flaws in other locations on the bridge, which it attributes to water leaking through joints in the bridge “deck” (or road surface above the understructure). The VN Report concludes that the original plan to replace the broken tie-down “pins” is inadequate to address these pervasive flaws, and that efforts to repair these flaws within the bridge’s current structure present significant risks of failure.

2.     Implications of the VN Report

VN submitted its Report on February 21, the same day that RIDOT announced its plans to add a third lane in each direction of the remaining (southern) span of the Washington Bridge. If RIDOT concludes (as I believe it will) that the northern span must be replaced, it changes my understanding of the past, present and future of the Washington Bridge in these ways:

a.     The Past

At the Joint Oversight Committee’s first hearing, members asked questions concerning inspections of the tie-down “pins” whose failure was noted for the first time in December. I believe we were trying to determine whether RIDOT could have identified the need to repair and replace those pins earlier than it did, which could have saved the bridge from its immediate closure. The VN Report changes my understanding, because I read it to say that the pins’ failure was a symptom of larger problems that would have remained even if RIDOT had replaced the pins years ago.

If this is correct, my inquiry into the past changes from a focus on the pins to a broader question concerning RIDOT’s overall repair program design. In its 2019 BUILD Grant application, RIDOT noted some corroded steel components on the bridge, but outlined a repair project focused on the bridge’s “deck” rather than its understructure. At that time, RIDOT asserted that the proposed repairs could add 25 years to the bridge’s useful life, obviating the need for a “costly full replacement, a scope change which could more than double the cost of this project.” (emphasis in original.)

As a result, I would like to see future Joint Oversight Committee hearings explore the questions of (1) whether RIDOT could have taken steps during 2019-24 to shore up the bridge’s understructure to fulfill the project’s goal of adding 25 years to the bridge’s useful life, and/or (2) whether RIDOT’s better course would have been to plan for the bridge’s replacement in 2019, rather than incur the $30 million spent to date on a repair plan that was unlikely to succeed.

b.     The Present

It now appears likely that the Washington Bridge will be limited to a single (southern) span for a period of months and possibly years. If this is correct, I would like the Joint Oversight Committee to investigate the impacts of this no longer “interim” change on, among other things, (1) traffic patterns that affect travel times and local road conditions and (2) local businesses.

c.      The Future

RIDOT announced it will disclose its plans for the future of the Washington Bridge’s northern span in late February or early March. If (as I now expect) those plans will be to replace the bridge, the Joint Oversight Committee will need to learn answers to such questions as: (1) What lessons has RIDOT learned from the failure of the current bridge as it applies both to this bridge and others throughout the State? (2) What process will RIDOT employ to design and build the replacement? (3) How long will it take? (4) How much will it cost? and (5) How will it be paid for?

3.     Conclusion

I am not an engineer, and my lay person’s perspective may be 100% off-base. Also, I have much to learn about the facts and circumstances here. I will continue my own study and obtain expert insight when and where I can. With that said, the VN Report has significantly changed my understanding of the past, present and future of the Washington Bridge. I will work with the Joint Oversight Committee to continue our investigation to support the State’s best possible response to this event.

I hope you enjoyed the Super Bowl and survived the snow. This week’s letter discusses the first oversight hearing reviewing the closure of the westbound Washington Bridge.

On Monday, February 12, the Senate and House Oversight Committees held their first joint hearing to review the Washington Bridge closure. The Committees have a broad charge, looking to what happened in the past, how the closure is being managed in the present, and what actions the Department will take in the future to repair or replace the bridge.

A.   The Decision To Close The Bridge

At the hearing, RIDOT presented a Slide Deck with information about the bridge closure. On Friday, December 8, an engineer from VHB inspected the recently-painted steel girders (or “beams”) in Span 7. While there, he noticed that a tie-down pin that attached one of the girders had broken, leaving a gap. (See Slide 7). A team of VHB engineers returned Monday morning December 11. They observed that several of the girders were moving as traffic went across the deck, indicating the possible failure of other tie-down pins and the risk of bridge failure. RIDOT closed the bridge that afternoon.

B.    The Response To The Structural Failure

1.     Assembling An Investigative Team

In response, RIDOT assembled a team of six consultants (See Slide 5), and the Governor engaged a seventh consultant to perform a separate forensic analysis (i.e. explain when and why the tie down pin failed). In addition to its own forensic consultant, RIDOT engaged a consultant who specializes in non-invasive testing, such as X-rays and ultrasonic testing, that will allow RIDOT to review the condition of structural elements that are not visible.

2.     Revising The Initial Repair Plan

At first, RIDOT believed that it would be possible to repair the bridge by replacing the twelve tie-down pins and related hardware in Span 7. Since that time, the consultants have conducted further testing of the six beams in Span 7, as well as beams in other spans of the bridge. RIDOT concluded that its original repair plan may be insufficient, and that a range of possible repairs (up to replacement) is possible. RIDOT expects to have a complete analysis by late February or early March, at which time it will select a repair or replacement plan.

C.    How And Why The Failure Occurred

1.     RIDOT’s Initial Repair Plan

In its 2019 BUILD Grant application for funding a part of the project’s $70 million total cost, RIDOT stated that (1) the bridge was in poor condition, (2) the proposed repairs could add 25 years to its useful life and (3) delaying construction “will ultimately result in a necessary, costly full replacement, a scope change which could more than double the cost of this project.” (emphasis in original.) The document identified areas where the bridge required “significant rehabilitation,” focusing on the underside of the bridge deck and the superstructure. The application did not mention the tie down pins.

2.     The Importance Of The Tie Down Pins

We now know that the tie-down pins at Span 7 are a critical element of the bridge’s structural integrity. As a result, I am interested in the following questions:

·        Would the present closure have occurred if RIDOT had addressed the issue of the tie down pins earlier?

·        Were there reasonable opportunities to detect and address the problem of the tie down pins earlier?

·        If so, which actors could have addressed this problem prior to the discovery of structural failure on December 8, 2023, and when could/should they have done so?

3.     Next Steps

In looking for answers to these questions, I am mindful of the saying that “hindsight is always 20-20,” and the record of information the Committee has assembled to date is in its earliest stages.  With that said, I question whether RIDOT could have benefitted in 2019 from the expertise of the consultants it engaged this past December. As Chair McKenney noted, this project has cost a total of almost $100 million, so it is not intuitively clear how this issue could have been missed, or why consultants who could have provided useful information were not engaged due to cost concerns.

At the hearing, I requested certain types of additional information and additional witnesses that will supplement the record, and hopefully provide a basis to resolve these critical questions of accountability, as well as provide lessons learned for repairs in the remaining inventory of bridges.

The General Assembly will observe its February recess next week. I therefore expect to send out my next letter in two weeks (i.e. Sunday, March 3). Until then, I wish you all the best.